British Weapons Acquisition Policy and the Futility of Reform by Warren A. Chin

Author:Warren A. Chin [Chin, Warren A.]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: Political Science, General
ISBN: 9781351162340
Google: DCGwDwAAQBAJ
Goodreads: 51990554
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 2019-09-17T00:00:00+00:00

Thatcherism and the Defence Industrial Base: 1979–83

Between 1979 and 1983, the government, like its predecessors, maintained a strong commitment to the protection and development of the UK defence industrial base (DIB). An early illustration of this can be seen in the 1980 Defence White Paper:

The ability to develop and produce arms is ... an important national asset. It ensures supply; it enables British requirements to be met in an appropriate and timely way; it provides domestic employment; it can be paid for in our own currency; ... Above all because of its contribution to defence, it helps maintain our national security. The Government intends, therefore, to give full support to British industry.8

Similarly, the 1981 Defence White Paper expanded on this theme of the importance of the DIB to the overall well being of the UK:

There are clearly important reasons why we should normally aim to buy British. The arguments for doing so are not limited to the direct benefits of employment and the saving on imports. The long term commitment of British industry to meeting our national defence needs swells the national investment in R&D and technological progress, and helps us to guarantee the maximum pay-off from that investment. It bolsters our defence sales potential and improves British industry's credentials for winning a worth while and challenging part in international collaborative projects. Besides, self reliance in defence - bringing with it the freedom to shape our requirements primarily to our own need - has a value in its own right. It may be false economy to opt for a cheaper foreign product if the result is to weaken or to lose altogether British industry's own producing capacity in that line.9

In 1981, Sir John Nott, then Defence Secretary, when asked about his attitude towards the defence industries, made it clear that he supported a buy-British policy in defence procurement: 'I am very conscious of the need to protect, encourage, and enhance the defence industrial base and wherever possible we will do that within the resources available.'10 It was also clear that, even though he was concerned to maximise the use of resources, and that he would not buy British equipment at any price, he was prepared to pay a premium for British equipment because of the military, political, economic, technological, and industrial benefits that were derived from maintaining national defence industries.11

Even after the 1981 Defence Review, a process that was expected to have significant consequences for particular areas of the DIB,12 Nott remained adamant that the MoD would continue to support national defence industries whenever possible. However, he also emphasised that the MoD was not committed to supporting the defence industrial base for its own sake.13

Further evidence of Nott's continuing support for the DIB can be seen in terms of the MoD's actions and policies. Confronted by the problem of escalating equipment costs, the response of the MoD was fairly orthodox. The main action taken by the MoD to address this problem was to attempt to reduce costs and save money through collaboration and exporting.

Download

Copyright Disclaimer:
This site does not store any files on its server. We only index and link to content provided by other sites. Please contact the content providers to delete copyright contents if any and email us, we'll remove relevant links or contents immediately.